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Much of my research focuses on industrial relations (the rela­
tionship between managers and labor-m ostly represented 
by trade unions). Thus, typically l study the impact of changes 
in the environment (be it economic, social, political, or legal 
environments) on the goals and strategies of employers and 
workers. In writing this article, I am using a particular case to 
provide readers with a flavor of the research that I conduct.
Currently, there is much interest in how globalization 
(change in the economic environments) is affecting South­
east Asia. On this note, I'd like to briefly examine how the 
Asian financial crisis (arguably deepened by the integration of 
financial markets globally) has affected workers in selected 
Southeast Asian countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and 
the Philippines). I w ill also attempt to explain why workers in 
some of these countries fared better than workers in others.
Much has been written about the causes of the Asian fi­
nancial crisis and I w ill not revisit that here. Briefly, as a result 
of the financial and currency crises, and the austerity mea­
sures recommended by the IM F (International Monetary 
Fund), significant "real" effects were felt on the Asian econo­
mies beginning in late 1997. In terms of a broad measure, 
negative GDP growth rates were seen across the region in 
1998 (in contrast to growth of approximately eight percent a 
year for the past three decades). While there is general agree­
ment that the crisis is over, given increasing growth rates in 
all of Asia in 1999, several authors also warn that the recov­
ery, at best, is very fragile. However, the impact of the crisis 
on workers of all kinds was quite severe.
The predominant short-term industrial relations conse­
quences of the crisis were the loss of jobs and falling wages 
throughout the region. It should be noted, however, that the 
effect on unemployment in particular is very difficult to mea­
sure: unemployment rates are inherently constructed and 
"unreal" compared to employment counts. Also, unemploy­
ment rates are particularly difficult to evaluate and measure 
in the developing countries of the region, considering the loss 
of jobs by migrant workers in other countries and the fact 
that many people have responded to the crisis by returning 
to the rural and informal sectors, and are therefore exiting the 
formal labor force. Measures of unemployment rates in 1998 
in the countries most affected by the crisis include 4.9 per­
cent in Malaysia (Mansor et al. 1999), 5.4 percent in Indone­
sia (Islam et al. 1999), 10.1 percent in the Philippines 
(Esguerra et al. 1999), and 13.7 percent in Thailand 
(Mahmood 1999). Notwithstanding the measurement issues, 
it is thus clear that the crisis turned the abstract possibility of 
layoffs (abstract given the tremendous growth most of these 
countries had experienced for the past few  decades) into a 
reality in the region.
In addition to the return of industrial workers back to the 
rural economy (Wolfensohn 1998), an immediate response 
to the rise in unemployment has been the repatriation of 
guest workers, most notably in Thailand and Malaysia. And 
with unemployment and economic desperation rising, there 
is evidence of a reversal of the trend toward improved labor 
standards and working conditions, with desperate workers 
more willing to take any work that is available, even if 
conditions are unsafe or undesirable (e.g., New York Times 
6/15/98). The economic conditions of women in particular 
have worsened; Atinc and Walton (1998:16) detail some of 
the impacts of the crisis on wom en: "Women lose their jobs 
first, and families pull their daughters out of school before 
sons . . .  when income shortfalls require reductions in food 
intake, women and girls sometimes face disproportionate 
cuts. Social organizations also point to a rise in domestic vio­
lence and prostitution." The incidence of unprecedented high 
and unexpected job loss in combination with the historical 
lack of social safety nets have contributed greatly to the hard­
ships felt by those who have lost their jobs and those who 
are seeking jobs (Lee 1998).
At the same time that unemployment has been increas­
ing, the extreme currency depreciations have contributed to a 
situation in which inflation has been rising and real wages 
have been falling, so that hardships have increased even for 
those who remain employed. Together, the combination of 
unemployment and the fall in purchasing power has led to 
an increase in social unrest (particularly in Indonesia and 
some parts of Thailand), and an increase in labor disputes 
and strikes (particularly in Thailand, but more severely in In­
donesia). The crisis has made it imperative for employers to 
take measures to cut costs and improve functional and nu­
merical flexibility. Layoffs are concentrated in the heavily- 
unionized industrial sectors, causing unions to lose strength. 
And weak unions, left with few alternatives, often turn to the 
strike when they are unable to collaborate with management.
Where laid-off workers had been represented by unions, 
the reduction in employment by firms was associated with a 
deterioration in labor-management relationships. However, 
union density (the number of workers represented by unions 
as a percentage of the total number of non agricultural work­
ers) in Asia is low-density figures range between 10 and 18 
percent in Singapore and Malaysia, are lower than that in 
Indonesia and the Philippines, and lowest (2 percent) in 
Thailand. Given low densities, most of the workers who have 
lost their jobs are largely those without any union-based pro­
tections in the formal sector. In the informal economy, the 
impact of job loss is difficult to measure, although anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the numbers are huge.
13 SEÄP BULLETIN Fall-Winter 2000-01
In labor relations terms, two trends are noteworthy. First, 
while cutting labor on the one hand (the short-term response 
to the crisis), firms have also been engaged in restructuring 
their employment systems to become more productive. In 
our research of several industries in these nations, w e found 
that firms have used the financial crisis to push through 
longer-term restructuring strategies that they would not have 
been able to negotiate with unions prior to the crisis. There 
was enough evidence in our case studies to suggest that 
union bargaining power was significantly weaker during the 
crisis. This longer-term restructuring generally involved 
changes in work organization and human resource practices 
(functional flexibility) for the core workers who were not laid 
off. Second, given the social costs and consequent political 
impacts of widespread job loss, several countries have tried 
to create a more tripartite structure in which labor unions and 
employers are provided with some voice in the government 
decision-making process.
In Thailand, for example, the ILO (International Labor Or­
ganization) has been instrumental in encouraging moves 
towards tripartism, with some acceptance by workers' and 
employers' representatives, although unionization rates in 
Thailand are very low and collective bargaining is not very 
well developed. In the Philippines the major unions, the gov­
ernment, and the employers have voluntarily signed a tripar­
tite agreement, exhorting employers to use layoffs only as a 
last resort. The Philippines has also seen the increased use of 
labor-management councils at each firm (to increase labor- 
management cooperation and dialog) introduced by employ­
ers with government encouragement but with limited union 
acceptance. The tripartite agreement cannot be enforced 
however, because it only exhorts but does not require em­
ployers to refrain from laying off employees. During 1997, at 
least 37,000 workers were laid off permanently in the Philip­
pines, and by the first quarter of 1998, another 30,000 had 
lost their jobs. In Malaysia as well, a similar tripartite agree­
ment was entered into, with firms promising to use layoffs 
only as a last measure.
In general, at least in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philip­
pines, the movement toward tripartism has been minimal. 
Clearly, though, there are advocates for a more deep-seated 
movement towards tripartism. The ILO in particular argues 
that "more could surely be done to establish tripartite struc­
tures to promote social partnership, the development of so­
cial safety nets, and the advancement of basic rights," and 
that the current crisis has led to a stronger recognition among 
the social partners of "the need to strengthen systems of in­
dustrial relations and to improve channels of democratic par­
ticipation in economic and social policy choices." At the end 
of its report on the crisis, the ILO expresses the hope "that a 
new industrial relations culture is emerging, a culture of dia­
logue, recognition of and respect for each other's differences, 
and of a willingness to search for compromises that can strike 
an acceptable balance between economic considerations and 
social needs and ultimately maintain social cohesion." (ILO
1998) . In my view, however, the crisis has alerted the 
industrial relations actors to the need for increased labor- 
management cooperation in general terms. However, it is 
not clear that sustainable tripartism has taken root in these 
countries, given its limited history in most of the countries 
and the temptation to return to previous structures and 
modes of interaction with the quick economic recovery.
With tripartism on a shaky foundation at best, let's look 
at the other trend, the movement toward restructuring and 
functional flexibility by firms, and its impact on workers. In 
my view, the crisis accelerated pre-existing moves toward 
increased flexibility in employment relations as well as 
labor markets in the various countries in the region, within 
the context of the drive to increase labor productivity. In 
the Philippines, for example, employers have been more 
aggressive in workforce reduction and numerical flexibility­
enhancing strategies. There is evidence that suggests 
tremendous increases in contracting-out strategies, in 
particular in labor-only contracting (where workers are 
not employed directly but through subcontractors). This is a 
move away from the traditional employment contract, result­
ing in an increasingly casual or contract-labor dominated 
workforce (Kuruvilla, Erickson, Ofreneo, Amante, and Ortiz
1999) . Research by several authors has shown that the crisis 
has spawned a large pool of casual and temporary workers, 
and many jobs that were once permanent are now being 
contracted out. In our research in varied Filipino industries, 
we found jobs that have traditionally been regular (such as 
accountants) are now being contracted out, in violation of 
the laws. Filipino law clearly provides that jobs that are per­
manent in nature and done regularly within an enterprise 
cannot be contracted out, but employers either ignore the 
laws or find ways around them. At the time of this writing,
I found that fully 35 percent of all manufacturing was 
subcontracted out to casual labor.
In Malaysia, for example, although 20 percent of workers 
have lost their jobs, in almost all cases they were foreign 
workers. Although the figures of the Malaysian government 
state that 10 percent of its workers are foreign, more realistic 
estimates suggest that a fifth to a quarter of the workforce is 
comprised of foreign workers. Thus, given the tight labor mar­
kets in Malaysia, foreign guest workers acted as the buffer; 
they lost their jobs so that regular workers could continue. 
Importantly, foreign workers do not have special protections. 
Employers were only too willing to sign the tripartite agree­
ment promising to lay off workers only as a last resort, be­
cause that agreement governed layoffs only of permanent 
Malaysian workers. Further, there was a significant emphasis 
in Malaysia on retraining and skills development as Malaysian 
firms sought long-term functional flexibility as well. The over­
all unemployment rate in Malaysia nearly doubled from 2.6 
percent in 1996 to 4.9 percent in 1998.
Thus, in both Malaysia and the Philippines, I see the re­
sponses of firms to the Asian financial crisis as being a part of 
their responses to the more general pressures of globaliza­
tion that are gradually resulting in a regional but also intrana­
tional core-periphery distinction in the workforce. That is, 
while firms cut workers and also pursue functional flexibility
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strategies, a few  workers are getting the benefits of job secu­
rity and increased skills training, while a larger number are 
losing their jobs and ending up in the unprotected nonunion 
and contract sectors. The distinction between core and pe­
riphery is also felt in several other ways, notably in terms of 
increasing earnings differentials between permanent and 
temporary workers, between skilled and unskilled workers, 
and increased inequality in society generally. In both Malaysia 
and the Philippines, we found significant evidence that the 
earnings differential between regular and temporary workers 
(core versus periphery workers) had increased substantially 
during the crisis.
Singaporean workers have probably emerged relatively 
unscathed by the crisis. The primary mode of adjustment to 
the crisis was quite different in Singapore. First, in the 1998 
budget, the government made provisions for difficult times 
ahead. These included tax changes and concessions for com­
panies and individuals to help them ease business costs and 
enhance disposable income respectively. As economic 
growth declined further in the second quarter of 1998, the 
government unveiled in June a $2-billion off-budget package 
to boost the economy. The package consisted of three com­
ponents: cuts in government rents and charges for busi­
nesses, an increase in government infrastructure spending, 
and measures to stabilize the property, financial, and hotel 
sectors. To minimize job losses, wage moderation and flex­
ibility are an important part of the Singapore government's 
response to the crisis. Salaries of ministers and top civil ser­
vants were frozen for the rest of the year. On 26 May 1998, 
the National Wages Council (NW C) released its recommenda­
tions on wage adjustments for the year. Wage-restraint was 
emphasized to reflect the economic slowdown. The NWC 
also highlighted the need to contain non-wage costs (such as 
rents, utilities, and government fees and charges), monitor 
productivity growth, and pay greater attention to training and 
employability. As the economic crisis deepened, the NWC 
reconvened in September. On November 12, 1998, it recom­
mended a cut in wages of five to eight percent to boost in­
vestor confidence and sharpen companies' competitiveness. 
Further, to provide relief to companies, the industrial relations 
actors-employers, labor, and the government-chose to pro­
vide this financial relief through cutting the employers' contri­
bution to the CPF (the state-mandated retirement system), 
which was a significant way of reducing payroll costs by ten 
to fifteen percent.
These measures were clearly designed to provide relief for 
employers so that they would not begin mass retrenchments. 
To say that there were no retrenchments, however, would be 
a stretch. At least 20,000 workers were retrenched in 
Singapore. Yet, the job loss was not as critical in Singapore, 
given the nation's well-established skills development and 
retraining systems. Further, in May 1998, the government 
committed fifty million dollars to re-skill 20,000 workers, in­
cluding those retrenched under the Skills Redevelopment 
Program (SRP). Significantly, in Singapore, there was relatively 
little change in the earnings differentials of skilled versus un­
skilled or core versus periphery workers. During the financial
crisis, the unemployment rate went up from 1.8 percent in 
1997 to 2.2 percent in 1998.
The differences during the financial crisis in the fortunes of 
Singaporean workers versus workers in the Philippines and 
Malaysia are instructive. In both Malaysia and the Philippines, 
there was relatively little effort to protect workers from lay­
offs. Although there were tripartite agreements, those agree­
ments only exhorted employers to refrain from layoffs. The 
consequences of job loss have been quite extreme in the 
Philippines and Malaysia (although less so in Malaysia). In 
Singapore, however, the response of the government was far 
more equitable. There was an effort to find solutions that 
provided incentives for firms not to lay off workers. A number 
of different policies were brought to bear to keep employ­
ment high. And even when job loss was inevitable, there 
were skills-development institutions to help with the 
adjustments.
Of course, there are many reasons why Singapore was 
both less affected by the crisis and more responsive to it. 
However, the salience of labor's welfare in Singapore's re­
sponse to the financial crisis is noteworthy and quite different 
from the response in Malaysia and the Philippines. The differ­
ences between the industrial relations institutions of 
Singapore on the one hand, and those of Malaysia and the 
Philippines on the other, helps explain why workers fared 
comparatively better in Singapore than in the other two 
countries.
Singapore has had a tripartite system of industrial rela­
tions since the 1960s, in which representatives of govern­
ment, representatives of employers, and representatives of 
trade unions jointly take decisions on a number of issues in 
the economy and society. Many government agencies are 
governed on a tripartite basis, including the pension adminis­
tration and the national council that makes wage recommen­
dations. Tripartism was seen in the 1960s as a means to 
introduce some stability in industrial relations by providing 
employers as well as employees a voice in national decision­
making. Over the years, tripartism has become more deeply 
rooted in Singapore, as each new government institution, 
such as the recent skills development system, have been gov­
erned in a tripartite manner. This has ensured labor's partici­
pation in many national decisions as well as enabled the 
three actors to make decisions that reflect all of their inter­
ests. And it has enabled the three actors to respond flexibly to 
crises. An interesting example in the past concerns the use of 
the industrial relations institutions as a lever in attracting 
higher-quality investment. In the late 1970s, it was becoming 
quite clear that Singapore's future as a low cost investment 
site was threatened. The need was to become a more higher- 
cost-higher-skill economy, and to attract higher-quality in­
vestment. The tripartite national wages council raised wages 
by more than 10 percent for three years, successfully driving 
the low cost-investors out of Singapore, while the govern­
ment tinkered with both the investment incentives and the
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education system to attract higher-quality investors. Similarly, 
in their response to the Asian financial crisis, it was clear that 
the tripartite system reflected labor's interests to a consider­
able extent.
In both Malaysia and the Philippines, in contrast, there has 
been no real tripartism. Their industrial relations systems are 
not organized based on the tripartite framework, and conse­
quently, labor has little voice in any national decisions. Sev­
eral authors suggest that in Malaysia there has been some 
suppression of the labor movement. For instance, unions 
were banned in the export-oriented electronics sector 
(Malaysia's most important sector in terms of employment 
and exports) until 1988. The government has resisted efforts 
by big union federations to merge to create a single national 
federation of workers. The effort of the Malaysian govern­
ment has been to ensure that labor has a voice only at the 
level of the firm (by suggesting that all new unions be 
enterprise-based), and even here there are some restrictions; 
for example, unions in the electronics industry cannot be 
affiliated to national union federations, although unions in 
other industries can be. Coupled with restrictions on bargain­
ing (unions are not allowed to bargain over transfers, promo­
tions, job assignments, and layoffs-issues that unions the 
world over routinely bargain about), it is clear that the voice 
of trade unions in decision-making at the local level itself is 
highly constrained, and completely absent at the national 
level. (Singapore has similar rules about the subjects of bar­
gaining, but the relative absence of a local voice is counter­
acted by the large voice unions have in national terms.)
In the Philippines, after Marcos there was relatively little 
formal repression of unions. But unions have little voice both 
nationally and locally in the Philippines for a number of other 
reasons. For one, the labor movement in the Philippines is 
extremely fragmented. There are more than one hundred fifty 
national federations of labor (compared to one in Singapore 
and two in Malaysia) with about eight thousand unions affili­
ated to them. Although these eight thousand unions claim to 
represent about three million members, in reality only sixty 
thousand workers are actually covered by collective bargain­
ing agreements. The process of union formation in the Philip­
pines is based on the U.S. system of elections, but given the 
many competing unions, often the result is that no single 
union wins the representation elections. Further, employers 
in the Philippines (we studied several U.S. employers in the 
electronics industry) are quite firmly and openly anti-union, 
which inhibits union activity. (The laws are not strong enough 
to completely ban anti-union strategies of employers.)
Further, labor's only mechanism to wield influence at the 
national level is through politics. However, given the division 
in the house of labor, there is no unified labor bloc or vote 
that can be used to pressure politicians to enact labor-friendly
legislation. In the last election, every candidate supported by 
the dominant labor federation lost!
Thus, the point I want to make is that countries with in­
dustrial relations institutions that permit a significant labor 
voice tend to make decisions keeping the welfare of labor in 
mind to a greater extent than countries that do not have 
strong industrial relations institutions. While this is not a new 
observation (there is a large body of literature on corporatist 
and tripartite systems in Europe) it has very important impli­
cations in Asia in the new global economy. Asian nations are 
characterized by much lower densities of unionization than 
their European and even their U.S. counterparts. They are still 
developing, and are facing, with globalization, the prospect 
of a divided workforce (the core-periphery distinction), with 
larger numbers of workers in the periphery and in the infor­
mal sector. Absent other policy initiatives, strengthening in­
dustrial relations institutions is the only hope for worker 
protection in these nations.
1 The overall impact on women's employment levels is difficult to 
gauge, given that women are often disproportionately targeted for 
layoff (Atinc and Waltin 1999) and the (difficult to measure) in­
crease in home-based work resulting from the crisis (Severino 
1999).
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